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Abstract
We study the problem of learning a linear model to set the reserve price in order to maximize
expected revenue in an auction, given contextual information. First, we show that it is not
possible to solve this problem in polynomial time unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis fails.
Second, we present a strong mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation for this problem,
which is capable of exactly modeling the nonconvex and discontinuous expected reward function.
Moreover, we show that this MIP formulation is ideal (the strongest possible formulation) for
the revenue function. Since it can be computationally expensive to exactly solve the MIP
formulation, we also study the performance of its linear programming (LP) relaxation. We show
that, unfortunately, in the worst case the objective gap of the linear programming relaxation
can be O(n) times larger than the optimal objective of the actual problem, where n is the
number of samples. Finally, we present computational results, showcasing that the mixed-
integer programming formulation, along with its linear programming relaxation, are able to
superior both the in-sample performance and the out-of-sample performance of the state-of-the-
art algorithms on both real and synthetic datasets.
1 Introduction
Digital advertising has been a tremendously fast growing industry in recent years – the worldwide
digital advertising expenditure has reached $ 283 billion in 2018, and it is estimated to further grow
to $ 517 billion in 2023.1
Among all advertisement allocation mechanisms, real time bidding (RTB) is perhaps one of the
most significant developments during the past decade, and it is widely applied at the major online
advertising platforms, including–but not limited to–Google, Facebook, and Amazon. In RTB for
display ads, an auction held by an Ad Exchange is triggered once a user visits a webpage, and the
winner of the auction earns the ad slot and pays the publisher a certain price.
A form of auction commonly used in practice by Ad Exchanges is a second-price auction with reserve
price [22]. In such auctions, the highest bidder wins the ad slot and pays the maximum of the second
∗Rice University
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1Digital advertising spending worldwide 2018-2023 https://www.statista.com/statistics/237974/online-
advertising-spending-worldwide/
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Figure 1: The revenue function r(v; b(1), b(2)).
price and a reserve price set by the the publisher or the Ad Exchange. In particular, the reserve
price of an ad slot can help improve the revenue if it is between the top two bids.
One central question for Ad Exchanges is how to set the reserve price for each incoming impression
in order to maximize the total revenue. In general, the reserve price is set based on the contextual
information of the ad campaign, including data pertaining to the publisher (e.g. ad site and ad
size), user (e.g. device type and various geographic information), or time (e.g. date and hour). In
this paper, we study an offline linear model to set the reserve price for each individual ad slot by
utilizing its contextual information in order to maximize the total revenue on the seller side. This
maximization problem can be formalized as:
max
β∈X
R(β) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
r(wi · β ; b(1)i , b(2)i ), (1)
where b(1)i and b
(2)
i are the (nonnegative) highest bidding price and second highest bidding price
of impression i, respectively, wi ∈ Rd is the contextual feature vector of impression i, and X =
[L,U ] ⊆ Rd is a bounded hypercube which serves as a feasible region for the model parameters β .
Additionally, r is a discontinuous reward function given as
r(v; b(1), b(2)) :=

b(2) v ≤ b(2)
v b(2) < v ≤ b(1)
0 v > b(1)
. (2)
Figure 1 plots the reward function r(v; b(1), b(2)), which is a simple univariate (though discontinuous)
function for given constants b(1) and b(2). The revenue function is a constant if v is either set below
b(2) or above b(1), and it increases linearly if v is between b(2) and b(1). In other word, by setting
the reserve price between b(2) and b(1), the seller can potentially capture more revenue from the
auctions. However, the reserve price r is set before observing the bidding prices b(1) and b(2), and
the seller must be cautious to not set the reserve price too high, as an unsuccessful auction results
in a significant drop in revenue when v > b(1). At the two extremes, this setting recovers a first
price auction (by setting b(2) = b(1)) or a pure price-setting problem (by setting b(2) = 0).
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Figure 2: Average revenue function R(β) with d = 1 features and n = 8 samples.
Although the univariate function r(v; b(1), b(2)) is simple, the average revenue function R(β) can be
extremely complicated, even for small problem instances. Figure 2 plots the average revenue R(β)
with single feature (i.e. β ∈ R) and 8 samples, randomly drawn from a log-normal distribution as
specified in Section 4. As we can see in Figure 2, the average revenue function R(β) has many local
maximizers and is discontinuous, even in the small-sample, univariate setting. This complexity will
only be exacerbated in the large-sample, multivariate case which is the focus of this paper.
1.1 Our Results
Our contribution in this work is threefold.
Hardness (Section 2). Our first main result is to build off the intuition gleaned from Figure 2
to show that (1) is, indeed, a hard problem. In particular, we show that there is no algorithm that
solves (1) in polynomial time unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis fails. The Exponential Time
Hypothesis is a very popular assumption is computational complexity and it is the basis of many
hardness results [34, 42, 29, 13, 18, 36, 10, 1, 11]. This computational complexity assumption is
based on the 3-SAT problem, a famous problem which is in the core of NP-complete problems [31].
The Exponential Time Hypothesis states that 3-SAT can not be solved in subexponential time in
the worst case. In order to show this result, we reduce our problem to the classic k-densest subgraph
problem.
New algorithms (Section 3). Knowing that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for solving
(1), we model the problem exactly using Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP). MIP is an optimization
methodology capable of modeling complex, nonconvex feasible regions, and which is widely used
in practice. In particular, MIP allows us to exactly model the underlying discontinuous reward
function, without relying on convex or continuous proxies which may be poor approximations or
require careful hyperparameter tuning.
One issue with MIP is that it is not scalable beyond medium-sized instances (roughly speaking,
we can potentially solve a MIP with hundreds to thousands variables, but not with about ten
thousands variables). In order to deal with the large-scale problems in daily auctions, we propose
a Linear Programming (LP) relaxation of our proposed MIP formulation. Modern LP solvers, such
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as Gurobi, are capable to solve very large LPs with millions of variables. The solution to the LP
not only provides a valid upper bound to the optimal expected revenue, but can also lead to a
acceptable solutions to (1). On the other hand, we show that there exist pathological instances
where the LP relaxation can produce arbitrarily bad bounds on the true optimal reward.
Computational validation (Section 4). Finally, we present a thorough computational study
on both synthetic and real data. We start with a low-dimensional artificially generated data set
where we observe that existing methods, while exhibiting low generalization error, are substan-
tially outperformed by our MIP-based approaches. We also perform an analysis on a real data set
comprised of eBay sports memorabilia auctions, where we observe a consistent improvement of our
MIP-based methods over existing techniques. In both studies, we observe that our MIP formulation
substantially outperforms the LP relaxation, its convex counterpart, suggesting the merit of using
principled nonconvex approaches for this problem.
1.2 Related Work
Reserve Price Optimization Reserve price optimization has been widely studied both in both
academia and industry due to its critical role in online advertisement. A major difference of our
setting and previous works on reserve price optimization is how to utilize the contextual information
w. Most previous theoretical works proceed under the assumption that the bidding prices come from
a certain distribution without the consideration of contextual information. For example, [12] shows
a regret minimization under the assumption that all bids are independently drawn from the same
unknown distribution; [30] shows the constant reserve is optimal when the distribution is known
and satisfies certain regularity assumptions; [2] studies the case when the buyers are strategic and
would like to maximize their long-term surplus.
In practice, however, an Ad Exchange logs the contextual information of every auction and utilizes
that to determine the future reserve price. For example, in a large field study at Yahoo! [39],
the contextual information of actions is used to learn the bidding distribution of buyers, which is
then utilized to set up the future reserve price. This is an indirect use of contextual information.
In contrast, our optimization problem (1) builds a linear model for reserve price optimization by
directly using the contextual information.
To the best of our knowledge, the only work which directly uses the contextual information to set
up the reserve price is that of Mohri and Medina [38]. In order to handle the discontinuity in the
revenue function r, [38] present a continuous piecewise linear surrogate function, and optimize over
this surrogate function using difference-of-convex programming. There are several difficulties of the
method proposed in [38]: (i) it is highly non-trivial to tune the hyper-parameter γ in the surrogate
function, which controls the closeness of the two problems and the hardness to solve the surrogate
problem; (ii) the global convergence of difference-of-convex programming is slow (requiring, e.g., a
cutting plane or branch-and-bound method) and requires a exceedingly careful implementation [26],
and (iii) it can only find a local optimizer of the surrogate problem. In contrast, we directly solve
the reserve price optimization problem (1) by mixed-integer programming.
Mixed-Integer Programming for Piecewise Linear Functions Mixed-integer programming
has long been used to model piecewise linear functions arising in optimization problems arising
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in a number of application areas as disparate as operations [16, 17, 33], analytics [7, 8], engineer-
ing [23, 24], and robotics [19, 20, 32, 37]. In this literature, our approach is most related to a
recent strain of approaches applying mixed-integer programming to model high-dimensional piece-
wise linear functions arising as trained neural networks for various tasks such as verification and
reinforcement learning [4, 3, 40, 41]. Moreover, there are incredibly sophisticated and mature imple-
mentation of algorithms for mixed-integer programming (i.e. solvers) that can reliably solve many
instances of practical interest in reasonable time frames.
Hardness We study the hardness of the reserve price optimization problem (1) and show that it
is impossible to solve this optimization problem in polynomial time unless the Exponential Time
Hypothesis [27] fails. The exponential time hypothesis is a very popular assumption in computational
complexity and it is the basis for many hardness results such as approximating the best Nash
equilibrium [11], k-densest subgraph [10, 27], SVP [1], network design [14], and many others [34,
42, 29, 13, 18, 36].
2 Hardness
In this section we show the hardness of the reserve price optimization problem (1). Specifically,
we show that it is not possible to solve this problem in polynomial time unless the Exponential
Time Hypothesis fails. We prove this by showing that a polynomial time optimal algorithm for this
problem implies a polynomial time constant approximation algorithm for the k-densest subgraph
problem.
Definition 1 (k-densest subgraph problem). In the k-densest subgraph problem, given a graph
G = (VG, EG), where VG represents the vertex set and EG represents the edge set. The goal is to
find a subgraph H = (VH , EH) ⊆ G with |VE | = K that maximizes |EH ||VH | .
In fact, there is no |VG|−1/ poly(log log |VG|)- approximation polynomial time algorithm for the k-densest
subgraph problem unless the exponential time hypothesis fails [36], and hence our reduction implies
that there is no polynomial time algorithm for the reserve price optimization problem (1), unless
the Exponential Time Hypothesis fails.
Theorem 1. There is no polynomial time algorithm for the reserve price optimization problem (1),
unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis fails.
Proof. Let G = (VG, EG) be an arbitrary input graph to the k-densest subgraph problem, where
VG is the vertex set of the graph and EG is the edge set of the graph. We construct an input to the
reserve price optimization problem (1) based on G, so that if it were possible to solve the reserve
price optimization problem for this input in polynomial time, this would imply that it is possible
to find an 1/8-approximate solution to the k-densest subgraph problem on G in polynomial time.
However, it is known that it is impossible to give a polynomial time 1/8 approximation algorithm
for the densest subgraph problem unless the exponential time hypothesis fails [36]. This implies
that it is impossible to solve the reserve price optimization problem (1) unless the exponential time
hypothesis fails.
Next, we explain how to construct an input to the reserve price optimization problem (1) based on
G. In the optimization problem we set X = [0, 1]d. We have two types of impressions as explained
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below.
• We have |VG|2 impressions (w1, k, 0), where w1 = 〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉.
• For each edge e = (u, v) ∈ EG, we have one impression (we, 2, 1.5), where we is a feature
vector in which the components corresponding to v and u are 1, and all other components are
0.
First, we lower bound the optimal solution of the optimization problem (1) for this input. Consider
a densest subgraph H = (VH , EH) of G, where VH is the vertex set of H and EH is the edge set
of H. We define βH to be a feature vector in which the features corresponding to the vertices of
VH are 1, and all other features are 0. Next we bound R(βH). We use this as a lower bound the
optimum solution of the optimization problem (1).
Note that w1 ·βH = k, and hence the contribution of each of the first type of impressions to R(βH)
is kn . Also, for each edge e ∈ EH we have we · βH = 2 and hence the contribution of each of the
second type of impressions corresponding to an edge in EH to R(βH) is 2n . Therefore, we have
R(βH) =
1
n
(
k|VG|2 + 1.5|EG|+ 0.5|EH |
)
. (3)
Next, we upper bound the optimal solution of the optimization problem (1) for our input. Let
β = 〈β1, . . . , βVG〉 be the vector that maximizes R(β). Note that if
∑
v βv > k, the contribution of
the first type of impressions is 0. This means that R(β) ≤ 2|EG| < R(βH), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume that
∑
i βi ≤ k.
Let V β be the set of vertices in VG with βv ≥ 0.5. Let Gβ = (V β , Eβ ) be the subgraph of G induced
by V β . Note that if for a vertex v we have βv < 0.5, then for each edge e = (v, u) neighboring v,
we have we · βH ≤ 1 + 0.5 = 1.5. Therefore, we have
R(β) ≤ k|VG|2 + 1.5|EG|+ 0.5|Eβ |. (4)
Now, we put inequalities (3) and (4) together to complete the proof. By the optimality of β we have
R(βH) ≤ R(β). This together with inequalities (3) and (4) implies that |EH | ≤ |Eβ |. Moreover,
recall that for every vertex v in V β we have βv ≥ 0.5. Also, we have
∑
i βi ≤ k. Hence, we have
|V β | ≤ 2k. Given a graph with 2k vertices, one can easily cover the edges with 8 subgraphs of size
k. By the pigeon hole principle one of these subgraphs contains E
β
8 ≥ EH7 edges, and hence it is a
1
8 -approximate solution to the densest subgraph.
3 Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation
In this section, we develop a mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation for solving (1), study its
important computational properties, and discuss how it can be practically used to solve (1).
MIP is an common optimization methodology capable of modeling complex, nonconvex feasible
regions. In general, a MIP formulation can model a set S ⊆ Rn as
S = { x | ∃y ∈ Rm, z ∈ Zr, (x, y, z) ∈ R } ,
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where R is a polyhedron in Rn+m+r.
In order to model (1) with MIP, we first start with the graph of the revenue function r(·; b(1), b(2)),
which is defined as:
gr(r(·; b(1), b(2));D) :=
{
(v, y)
∣∣∣ v ∈ D, y = r(v; b(1), b(2)) } .
This set is not closed, due to the discontinuity of r at the input b(1). However, it is straightforward
to compute its closure.
Lemma 1. The closure of gr(r(·; b(1), b(2));D) is S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3, where
S1 =
{
(v, y) ∈ D × R
∣∣∣∣ y = b(2)v ≤ b(2)
}
(5a)
S2 =
{
(v, y) ∈ D × R
∣∣∣∣ y = vb(2) ≤ v ≤ b(1)
}
(5b)
S3 =
{
(v, y) ∈ D × R
∣∣∣∣ y = 0v ≥ b(1)
}
. (5c)
Moreover, working with the closure does not alter the optimization problem. That is, (1) can be
reformulated as the following optimization problem:
max
β,v,y
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi (6a)
s.t. vi = wi · β ∀i ∈ JnK (6b)
(vi, yi) ∈ cl(gr(r(vi; b(1)i , b(2)i ); [li, ui])) ∀i ∈ JnK (6c)
β ∈ X, (6d)
where the bounds on the v variables are computed as li := minβ∈X wi · β and ui := maxβ∈X wi · β .
The next proposition shows this formally.
Proposition 1. If a point (β,v,y) is an optimal solution for (6), then β is an optimal solution
for (1). Conversely, if β is an optimal solution for (1), then there exists some v and y such that
(β,v,y) is an optimal solution for (6).
Proof. First, we show that each optimal solution for (1) has a corresponding feasible point for (6)
with equal objective value. Take some β∗ optimal for (1). Setting v∗i = w
i · β∗ for each i, the
feasibility of β∗ (i.e. β∗ ∈ X) implies that li ≤ v∗i ≤ ui from the definition of li and ui. Now
take y∗i = r(v
∗
i ) for each i; clearly (6c) is satisfied. Therefore, (β
∗, v∗, y∗) is feasible for (6) and has
objective value 1n
∑n
i=1 r(vi; b
(1)
i , b
(2)
i ).
Next, we show that each optimal solution (β∗, v∗, y∗) for (6) corresponds to a feasible point β∗ for
(1) with the same objective value. Clearly β∗ is feasible for (1). Additionally, (6c) means that for
each i, if v∗i 6= b(1)i then y∗i = r(v∗i ), whereas if v∗i = b(1)i then y∗i ∈ {r(v∗i ) ≡ b(1)i , 0}. As b(1)i ≥ 0,
the optimality of (β∗, v∗, y∗) implies that we must have y∗i = r(v
∗
i ). Therefore, the objective value
of (β∗, v∗, y∗) is 1n
∑n
i=1 r(v
∗
i ; b
(1)
i , b
(2)
i ), giving the result.
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Given the representation for the closure of the graph of r as a union of three polyhedral sets in
Lemma 1, we can now construct a mixed-integer programming formulation for (6c).
Proposition 2. A valid MIP formulation for the constraint
(v, y) ∈ cl(gr(r(·; b(1), b(2)); [l, u])) (7)
is:
y ≤ b(2)z1 + b(1)z2 (8a)
y ≥ b(2)(z1 + z2) (8b)
y ≤ v + (b(2) − l)z1 − b(1)z3 (8c)
y ≥ v − uz3 (8d)
l ≤ v ≤ u (8e)
1 = z1 + z2 + z3 (8f)
z ∈ [0, 1]3 (8g)
z ∈ Z3. (8h)
Proof. Suppose (vˆ , yˆ , zˆ) is feasible for (8). It follows from (8f-8h) that exactly one component of zˆ
is equal to one, with the other two components equal to zero. We now consider each of these three
cases.
If zˆ1 = 1, then the constraints (8a–8e) reduce to y = b(2), v ≤ y ≤ v + b(2) − l, and l ≤ v ≤ u.
Plugging in the equation for y into the second pair of inequalities yields l ≤ v ≤ b(2), which are the
constraints defining S1.
If zˆ2 = 1, the constraints (8a–8e) reduce to b(2) ≤ y ≤ b(1), y = v, and l ≤ v ≤ u, which are
equivalent to the constraints defining S2.
Finally, if zˆ3 = 1, the constraints (8a–8e) reduce to y = 0, v − u ≤ y ≤ v − b(1), and l ≤ v ≤ u.
Plugging the equation into the pair of inequalities yields b(2) ≤ v ≤ u, i.e. the constraints are
equivalent to those defining S3.
Piecing it all together, we can present a MIP formulation for the original problem (1).
Corollary 1. Take F (b(1), b(2), l, u) as the set of all points feasible for (8), given the data b(1), b(2),
l, and u. Then (1) is equivalent to
max
β,v,y
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi (9a)
s.t. vi = wi · β ∀i ∈ JnK (9b)
(vi, yi) ∈ F (b(1)i , b(2)i , li, ui) ∀i ∈ JnK (9c)
β ∈ X, (9d)
in the sense that: (i) if (β,v,y) is an optimal solution to (9), then β is an optimal solution to (1),
and (ii) if β is an optimal solution to (1), then there exists some v and y such that (β,v,y) is an
optimal solution to (9).
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In the rest of this section, we discuss different aspects of our MIP formulation (8) and its LP
relaxation, and in particular how we can utilize it in practice.
The Tightness of Formulation (8)
In general, there will exist many different possible MIP formulations for a given set. One way to
measure the quality of a MIP formulation is by inspecting how tightly the LP relaxation approxi-
mates the underlying nonconvex set, as MIP formulations with tight relaxations are likely to solve
much more quickly than those with looser relaxations [43]. The tightest possible MIP formula-
tion is an ideal formulation, where the extreme points of the LP relaxation are integral. The next
proposition shows that (8) is an ideal formulation of set (7).
Proposition 3. The MIP formulation (8) is an ideal formulation for (7), in the sense that the
linear programming relaxation (8a-8g) is a description of the convex hull of all (v, y,z) feasible for
(8).
Proof. Take D as the set of all (v, y,z) feasible for (8). Using Lemma 1, we can infer that D =⋃3
i=1(Si×{ei}), where ei ∈ {0, 1}3 is the i-th unit vector of all zeros except a 1 in the i-th coordinate.
Therefore, it can be expressed as a finite union of bounded polyhedron. Applying techniques due
to Balas [5, 6], we can write a lifted representation for the convex hull of D, i.e. one with auxiliary
vi and yi variables:
v =
3∑
i=1
vi (10a)
y =
3∑
i=1
yi (10b)
y1 = b(2)z1 (10c)
lz1 ≤ v1 ≤ b(2)z1 (10d)
y2 = v2 (10e)
b(2)z2 ≤ v2 ≤ b(1)z2 (10f)
y3 = 0 (10g)
b(1)z3 ≤ v3 ≤ uz3 (10h)
1 = z1 + z2 + z3 (10i)
z ∈ [0, 1]3. (10j)
Moreover, if R is the set of all points feasible for (10), it is known that Projv,y,z(R) = Conv(D),
i.e. the orthogonal projection eliminating the auxiliary variables vi and yi yields the convex hull of
the set of interest D. Therefore, the result follows by explicitly computing this projection, yielding
a system of linear constraints equivalent to the LP relaxation of (8), i.e. (8a-8g).
Use the three equations (10c), (10e), and (10g) to eliminate the yi variables. Then we may use the
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remaining equations (10a-10b) to eliminate v1 and v2, leaving the system
lz1 ≤ v − y + b(2)z1 − v3 ≤ b(2)z1
b(2)z2 ≤ y − b(2)z1 ≤ b(1)z2
b(1)z3 ≤ v3 ≤ uz3
1 = z1 + z2 + z3
z ∈ [0, 1]3.
We may then apply the Fourier-Motkzin elimination procedure (e.g. [15]([Chapter 3.1])) to project
out the last remaining auxiliary variable v3, giving the result.
The feasible region X = [L,U ]d
While the statement of the problem (1) constrains the model parameters β to lie within a bounded
hypercube, it may be difficult to infer the correct size of the domain a priori. To illustrate this, we
present a simple low-dimensional family of instances where the problem data remains bounded in
magnitude, but nevertheless the magnitude of the optimal model parameters goes to infinity.
Proposition 4. Fix n = 2 samples and d = 2 features, and consider X = R2, i.e. the unbounded
variant of (1). There exists a sequence of instances where the problem data is bounded in magnitude
by one, and yet the magnitude of the unique optimal solution to (1) grows arbitrarily large.
Proof. Parameterize the sequence of instances by i. For each i, define wi,1 = (
√
1− i−2, i−1),
wi,2 = (−√1− i−2, i−1), b(1)i = 1, and b(2)i = 0. Note that ||wi,1||2 = ||wi,2||2 = 1, and so all the
problem data is bounded in magnitude by one. The unique optimal solution to (1) is β i,∗ = (0, i),
giving the result.
In other words, we cannot bound the magnitude of the components of an optimal solution solely
as a function of n, d, and the magnitude of the data. However, due to existential representability
results [28], applying MIP formulation techniques to model (1) will require a bounded domain X
on the model parameters. To circumvent this, we model the magnitude of the bounding box as a
hyperparameter, and tune it using a validation data set. This is the same approach taken in the
difference-of-convex algorithm due to Mohri and Medina [38].
How to use the MIP formulation in practice
In general, mixed-integer programming encompasses a difficult class of problems, in both a theoret-
ical and a practical sense. Nonetheless, there exist exceedingly mature, robust, and sophisticated
solvers that are often capable of producing high-quality solutions and proofs of optimality for prob-
lems of practical interest. These implementations use a variant of branch-and-bound (e.g. [15,
Chapter 1.2]), which attempts to do an enumerative tree search in an efficient manner. However,
the solver can be terminated before the search has been exhausted (and optimality proven), and will
return the best solution found. In Section 4, we will present two variants of a MIP-based algorithm
that use this basic property. The first will terminate the algorithm after a pre-specified time budget
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is exceeded. The second terminates the the solver at the root node, before the enumerative procedure
begins. Up to this point, the solver will have run a bevy of heuristic methods to generate solutions
and strengthen its LP relaxation, but will not have begun its enumerative tree search procedure.
Crucially, these heuristics will rely on the knowledge that the underlying model is a MIP to produce
better solutions and tighter relaxations than are possible with a pure linear programming model
like the LP relaxation.
Our MIP formulation (8) comprises two types of constraints: linear equality or inequality con-
straints (8a-8g), and integrality constraints (8h). The linear programming relaxation comprises
only the linear constraints, and provides a valid dual upper bound on the optimal reward of a linear
programming formulation. Furthermore, for this particular problem, each feasible solution for the
linear programming relaxation corresponds to a feasible solution for the original problem (1).
Proposition 5. Take W (b(1), b(2), l, u) as the set of all points feasible for the linear programming
relaxation (8a-8g), given the data b(1), b(2), l, and u. Then a linear programming relaxation for (1)
is
max
β,v,y
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi (11a)
s.t. vi = wi · β ∀i ∈ JnK (11b)
(vi, yi) ∈W (b(1)i , b(2)i , li, ui) ∀i ∈ JnK (11c)
β ∈ X, (11d)
in the sense that the optimal reward of any feasible solution for (11) upper bounds the reward of any
feasible solution for (1). Moreover, for any feasible solution (β,v,y) to (11), β is a feasible solution
to (1).
Proof. The bound on objective values follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the fact that
F (b(1), b(2), l, u) ⊆ W (b(1), b(2), l, u) for any choice of data. Additionally, as (1) only constrains
β ∈ X, (11d) gives the feasibility result.
Therefore, a third approach to solve (1) is simply to solve the linear programming relaxation. Linear
programming problems can be solved in polynomial time, and there exist algorithms that can very
efficiently solve large scale problem instances. Therefore, the approach of Proposition 5 can be
applied to very large scale instances of the problem (1).
The quality of the LP relaxation
As shown in Proposition 5, the linear programming relaxation offers an alternative approach for
heuristically solving the problem (1). Roughly, the quality of the resulting solution will depend on
the strength of the relaxation, i.e. how closely it approximates the convex hull of all feasible points
for the MIP formulation (9). Additionally, modern MIP solvers depend heavily on the quality of
this relaxation to converge quickly by pruning large swaths of the search tree in the hopes of keeping
computation times manageable.
A straightforward corollary of Proposition 3 is that, if n = 1, the LP relaxation (11) is exact, and so
exactly represents the convex hull of feasible points for (9). Unfortunately, the composition of ideal
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formulations will, in general, fail to be ideal. In this subsection, we show that when n is permitted
to grow, the LP relaxation (11) can be of arbitrarily poor quality.
Proposition 6. There exists a family of instances of (1), parameterized by the sample size n, where
the true optimal reward in (1) decreases as 1/n, but the optimal reward for the LP relaxation (11)
is at least 1.
Proof. Consider the following problem instance parameterized by a positive integer T . Take n = 2T ,
m = 2, and X = [−1,+1]× {+1}. Furthermore, for each i ∈ JT K, define w+,i = (T, 1− i), b(1)+,i = 1,
and b(2)+,i = 0. Similarly, for each i ∈ JT K, define w−,i = (−T, 1 − i), b(1)−,i = 1, and b(2)−,i = 0. From
inspection, we can observe that for any β ∈ X, there is at most one i with r(wi · β ; b(1)i , b(2)i ) > 0.
Therefore, we can infer that the optimal reward for (1) is 1, which can be attained by setting
β = (k/T, 1) for any k ∈ ⋃Tk=1{−k/T,+k/T}.
In contrast, the LP relaxation bound can be bounded below by a constant. By projecting out
the auxiliary z variables from the LP relaxation (8a-8g), we can compute that the convex hull of
cl(gr(r(·; 0, 1); [l, u])) is
Q(l, u) :={
(v, y) ∈ [l, u]× R≥0
∣∣∣∣ y ≤ 11− l (v − l), y ≤ 1u− 1(u− v)
}
.
Furthermore, for each i ∈ JT K we can computer valid bounds on v+,i as l+,i = minβ∈X w+,i · β =
−T + 1 − i and u+,i = maxβ∈X w+,i · β = T + 1 − i. Similarly, valid bounds for each v−,i are
l−,i = −T + 1− i and u−,i = T + 1− i. Piecing it all together, we now fix β = (0, 1), which due to
(11b) will fix v+,i = v−,i = 1 − i for each i ∈ JT K. Accordingly, the largest value we may set y+,i
such that (v+,i, y+,i) ∈ Q(l+,i, u+,i) is y+,i = TT+i . Similarly, the maximum allowed value for each
y−,i such that (11c) is satisfied is y−,i = TT+i . The reward at this LP feasible point is then
1
n
n∑
i=1
(y+,i + y−,i) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
T
T + i
+
T
T + i
)
=
n∑
i=1
1
T + i
≥
n∑
i=1
1
2T
= 1.
4 Computational study
In this section, we perform a computational study on the efficacy of our proposed methods on both
synthetic data and real data.
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4.1 Implementation Details
4.1.1 Methods
Throughout, we compare six methods:
1. CP: maxv 1n
∑n
i=1 r(v; b
(1)
i , b
(2)
i ) – This is an optimal constant reserve price policy (i.e, set the
reserve price as a constant for all samples without using contextual information). It is used
as a benchmark to measure the gain from contextual information.
2. LP: (11) – The linear programming relaxation of (9).
3. MIP: (9) – The MIP formulation terminated after a time limit (to be specified in subsequent
subsections).
4. MIP-R: (9) – The MIP formulation, terminated at the root node.
5. DC: The difference-of-convex algorithm of Mohri and Medina [38].
6. UB: 1n
∑n
i=1 b
(1)
i – This is a perfect information upper bound equal to the average first bid
price. This is the largest reward that can possibly be garnered from the auction. Note that
this may be quite a loose upper bound, as in general there will not exist a linear model capable
of setting such reserve prices given the contextual information.
4.1.2 Hyperparameter Tuning
The DC, LP, MIP-R, and MIP algorithms require that the model domain X = [L,U ]d is explicitly
specified. We utilize cross validation to tune the domain size as X = [−T, T ]d for T ∈ {2−5, . . . , 25}.
This cross validation step is the same as is done by Mohri and Medina [38].
Additionally, the DC algorithm utilizes a continuous piecewise linear function to approximate the
discontinuous reward function r(v; b(1), b(2)). Thus, it requires another hyperparameter for the
“slope” of the linear approximation. We do the same cross-validation on this hyperparameter as
suggested in Mohri and Medina [38].
4.1.3 Evaluation
For each experiment, we report the average reward (i.e. R(β)) of the final model from each algorithm
on both the train and test data sets. Additionally, we report the proportion of sold impressions,
namely, the proportion of impressions that the set reserve price is less than the bid price. Finally, we
use the “gap closed” metric to measure the improvement of our proposed MIP algorithm over DC, the
best existing algorithm from the literature. Mathematically, we compute the gap closed as MIP−DCUB−DC ,
where in an abuse of notation we use the algorithm names to denote their respective rewards. Note
that UB serves as an upper bound on the best possible linear model, which can be a conservative
estimation.
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4.1.4 Implementation
We implement our experiment in Julia [9], using JuMP [21, 35] for modeling the MIP, MIP-R, LP,
and DC formulations. We use Gurobi v8.1.1 [25] to solve the optimization problems underlying
MIP, MIP-R, LP, and DC. We intend to open-source our implementation of the methods in the near
future.
4.2 Synthetic data
4.2.1 Data Generation.
Here we describe how we generate our synthetic data (wi, b(1)i , b
(2)
i )
n
i=1. First, the feature vectors
wi are generated i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution with identity covariance matrix, i.e., wi iid∼
1√
d
N(0, Id), normalized so that E‖wi‖22 = 1. In order to generate the bidding prices b(1)i and
b
(2)
i , we assume there are two buyers, and they have underlining generative parameters c1 and
c2, such that their bids come from log-normal distributions as bi1
iid∼ LN(c1 · xi, σ|c1 · xi|) and
bi2
iid∼ LN(c2 · xi, σ|c2 · xi|), where σ controls the signal-to-noise ratio of the log-normal distribution.
We then set b(1)i = (1+α)max{bi1, bi2} and b(2)i = (1−α)min{bi1, bi2}, where α is a dilation factor to
enlarge the difference between b(1)i and b
(2)
i .
2 Moreover, the underlying parameters c1 and c2 of the
two buyers should be correlated, since the bidding prices for high-valued slots should be high for all
buyers. In order to model this, we set c1 = h1 and c2 = ρh1+
√
1− ρ2h2, where h1, h2 iid∼ 1√dN(0, Id)
and ρ controls the correlation between c1 and c2.
Overall, we have three parameters in the data generation process: σ controls the signal-to-noise level
of the model, ρ controls the similarity between two buyers, and α controls the degree of flexibility
the seller has when setting a reserve price.
4.2.2 Experimentation
We fix d = 10 features, n = 1000 training samples, along with test and validation data sets
comprising 5000 samples each. We first set a “baseline” configuration for our generative model with
σ = 0.1, ρ = 0.9, and α = 0.5. To explore the robustness of our model to changes in the data
generation scheme, we then study three variants of this baseline with “high noise” (σ = 0.5), “low
correlation” (ρ = 0.5), and “low margin” (α = 0.1). For each of these four parameter settings, we
present aggregate results over three trials in Tables 1-4. In these experiments, we use a time limit
for MIP of 3 minutes.
In all four experiments, we observe that MIP offer a considerable improvement over DC. On the
baseline configuration, MIP closes an average of 80.82% of the gap left by DC on the training set, and
80.04% of the gap left remaining on the test set. Unsurprisingly, the high noise configuration leads
to degradation of performance with respect to the perfect information upper bound, but MIP is still
2We note that the dilation factor is similar to the scaling of the linear functions used in the synthetic data
generative model used in [38].
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reward proportion sold
method train test train test
CP 1.004 ±0.082 0.980 ±0.077 0.820 ±0.043 0.800 ±0.033
LP 0.944 ±0.004 0.940 ±0.045 0.613 ±0.014 0.619 ±0.043
MIP 1.511 ±0.019 1.486 ±0.005 0.998 ±0.001 0.990 ±0.001
MIP-R 1.484 ±0.025 1.461 ±0.040 1.0 0.991 ±0.001
DC 0.786 ±0.086 0.735 ±0.080 0.996 ±0.007 0.991 ±0.001
UB 1.682 ±0.057 1.672 ±0.040 1.0 1.0
Table 1: Results on our baseline synthetic data. In-sample gap closed: 80.82%. Out-of-sample gap closed:
80.04%.
reward proportion sold
method train test train test
CP 1.024 ±0.022 1.012 ±0.034 0.828 ±0.034 0.818 ±0.045
LP 0.841 ±0.017 0.839 ±0.037 0.544 ±0.036 0.550 ±0.023
MIP 1.376 ±0.011 1.352 ±0.014 0.978 ±0.002 0.964 ±0.007
MIP-R 1.195 ±0.110 1.185 ±0.102 0.923 ±0.153 0.917 ±0.144
DC 0.783 ±0.063 0.757 ±0.040 0.965 ±0.009 0.963 ±0.010
UB 1.815 ±0.090 1.804 ±0.055 1.0 1.0
Table 2: Results on our high noise synthetic data. In-sample gap closed: 57.50%. Out-of-sample gap closed:
56.87%.
reward proportion sold
method train test train test
CP 1.031 ±0.018 1.028 ±0.019 0.844 ±0.013 0.841 ±0.015
LP 0.921 ±0.022 0.915 ±0.045 0.560 ±0.022 0.553 ±0.011
MIP 1.497 ±0.021 1.487 ±0.004 0.999 ±0.001 0.988 ±0.005
MIP-R 1.477 ±0.036 1.471 ±0.015 1.0 0.990 ±0.001
DC 0.800 ±0.046 0.776 ±0.019 0.993 ±0.008 0.985 ±0.005
UB 1.762 ±0.096 1.769 ±0.062 1.0 1.0
Table 3: Results on our low correlation synthetic data. In-sample gap closed: 72.68%. Out-of-sample gap
closed: 71.76%.
reward proportion sold
method train test train test
CP 0.918 ±0.055 0.908 ±0.055 0.983 ±0.001 0.979 ±0.019
LP 0.908 ±0.034 0.894 ±0.011 0.796 ±0.021 0.794 ±0.006
MIP 1.123 ±0.032 1.097 ±0.022 0.999 ±0.001 0.985 ±0.002
MIP-R 1.002 ±0.034 0.988 ±0.029 0.937 ±0.063 0.932 ±0.068
DC 0.947 ±0.083 0.917 ±0.069 0.999 ±0.001 0.991 ±0.003
UB 1.256 ±0.074 1.246 ±0.064 1.0 1.0
Table 4: Results on our low margin synthetic data. In-sample gap closed: 56.76%. Out-of-sample gap
closed: 54.67%.
15
able to close 57.5% and 56.87% of the gap on the training and test data sets, respectively. The low
correlation configuration sees MIP closing 72.68% and 71.76% of the remaining gap on training and
test data sets, respectively, while on the low margin configuration MIP closes 56.76% of training gap
and 54.67% of testing gap.
While MIP-R does not quite attain the same level of performance as MIP, it is quite close and still
handily outperforms DC both in- and out-of-sample. The LP method also outperforms DC on three
of four experiments, albeit by a smaller margin. Indeed, the DC algorithm is unable to recover the
performance of the constant policy that completely disregards contextual information on three of the
four experiments. This is despite the fact that its model leads to a sale on nearly every impression.
In other words, the DC model fails by not setting reserve prices aggressively enough. In contrast, the
LP algorithm sets reserve prices too aggressively, leading to a model that successfully completes an
auction in only slightly more than half of all impressions. The MIP and MIP-R methods both attain
proportions sold near 1 while attaining very high reward. This indicates that they are not exploiting
a small number of impressions that garner a high reward, but instead are intelligently setting a
reserve price policy that captures excess reward across the population, without too aggressively
setting the prices so that many impressions fail to sell.
4.3 eBay auctions for sports memorabilia
In this section, we turn our attention to a real data set. In particular, we utilize a published
medium-size eBay data set for reproducibility, which comprises 70, 000 sports memorabilia auctions,
to illustrate the performance of our algorithms. The data set is provided by Jay Grossman and
subsequently studied in the context of reserve price optimization in [38].3 There are 78 features
in the data set, including seller information (e.g. seller rating and seller location), as well as item
information. We refer the reader to [38] for a more detailed description of the data set. Finally,
we set a time limit for MIP of 5 minutes, and note that we preprocess the data by normalizing the
bidding prices with the mean of their first prices.
Table 5 and Table 6 depict the average and the 95% confidence interval of the cumulative reward
and of the proportion sold using different algorithms on both training and testing data set over 10
random runs. In both, we use 2000 randomly selected samples from the data set for testing and
validation. In Table 5, we train using 2000 randomly selected samples, while in Table 6 we utilize
5000 training samples.
In Table 5, MIP outperforms all other methods, producing the best performing models as measured
on both the training and testing data sets. The DC algorithm is the next best performer, producing
higher quality models than both LP and MIP-R. Indeed, MIP closes 7.39% of the gap left by DC on
the training data set, with respect to the conservative UB upper bound. However, due to a lack of
generalization, this number shrinks considerably to 1.66% on the test data set. There is no doubt
that DC has a smaller generalization gap, although one plausible explanation for this could be the
additional hyperparameters tuned over in the DC method. Moreover, we emphasize that these gaps
are computed based on a conservative upper bound (i.e., UB) which, as observed in Section 4.2, may
be quite loose. In order to understand the behavior of the algorithms in a larger data context,
we increase the training data sample size to 5000 and repeat the eBay experiments. The results
3The dataset can be accessed at https://cims.nyu.edu/~munoz/data/.
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reward proportion sold
method train test train test
CP 0.563 ±0.007 0.568 ±0.010 0.922 ±0.053 0.925 ±0.054
LP 0.653 ±0.007 0.639 ±0.014 0.548 ±0.015 0.540 ±0.018
MIP 0.726 ±0.009 0.714 ±0.015 0.995 ±0.003 0.983 ±0.005
MIP-R 0.657 ±0.022 0.652 ±0.027 0.851 ±0.121 0.843 ±0.123
DC 0.704 ±0.007 0.709 ±0.016 0.998 ±0.000 0.989 ±0.002
UB 0.992 ±0.006 1.014 ±0.018 1.0 1.0
Table 5: eBay trials with 2000 training samples. In-sample gap closed: 7.39%. Out-of-sample gap closed:
1.66%.
reward proportion sold
method train test train test
CP 0.564 ±0.004 0.567 ±0.023 0.943 ±0.040 0.944 ±0.040
LP 0.643 ±0.009 0.635 ±0.015 0.527 ±0.011 0.523 ±0.011
MIP 0.731 ±0.009 0.725 ±0.013 0.994 ±0.005 0.991 ±0.004
MIP-R 0.596 ±0.038 0.596 ±0.041 0.999 ±0.000 0.997 ±0.001
DC 0.704 ±0.007 0.704 ±0.015 0.998 ±0.000 0.996 ±0.001
UB 1.002 ±0.006 0.999 ±0.023 1.0 1.0
Table 6: eBay trials with 5000 training samples. In-sample gap closed: 9.11%. Out-of-sample gap closed:
7.01%.
are depicted in Table 6. While the rankings of the algorithms remains the same, MIP is able to
extract more information from the larger data set. While the training reward grows, the models
produced generalize much more successfully to the testing data set. In contrast, the DC algorithm
appears unable to exploit the extra available data, with train and test accuracy that remain nearly
identical with the previous experiment. Indeed, MIP is able to close 9.11% of the remaining gap on
the training data set, and 7.01% on the testing data set.
Comparing Table 5 and Table 6, we can clearly see that the difference in reward produced by
MIP between the training and testing data sets decreases as number of samples increases. This is
intuitively consistent with what could be expected from a learning theory analysis, and we expect
that this gap will likely keep shrinking in the “big data” regime as we further enlarge the training
sample size.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the linear model for reserve price optimization in a second-price auction. We
first show that this is indeed a hard problem – unless the Exponential Time Hypothesis fails, there is
no polynomial time optimal algorithm. Then we propose a mixed-integer programming formulation
to exactly model this problem, and we show that this is ideal (i.e. the strongest possible formulation)
when the number of sample n = 1. Since it can be computationally expensive to exactly solve
the mixed-integer programming, we study the performance of its linear programming relaxation.
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Unfortunately, we provide a counter-example to show that, in the worst case, the objective gap
between the linear programming relaxation and the true problem can scale linearly in the number
of samples. Finally, we present a computational study of our methods on both synthetic dataset
and real dataset, showcasing the advantages of our proposed methods.
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